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The Fog of Nation Building: Lessons from Kosovo?
Edwin Villmoare*
In 2000, I volunteered to go to Kosovo with the American Bar Association's
("ABA") Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative. My position in Kosovo
was entitled "rule of law liaison."
The nature and purpose of my work appeared clear enough on paper. But
when my wife, Paula Huntley, and I arrived in Prishtina, the capital, where we
would live for the next eight months, the situation "on the ground" verged on
chaos. Kosovo had only recently been a war zone-and was now a place Louise
Arbor, the Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), called "one vast crime scene." The Kosovar Albanians and
the international community were running on adrenaline and hope. All problems
had to be immediately addressed; all problems, it was believed, had immediate
solutions. The ABA office and our home were both located on Dragodon Hill
where a mass grave had recently been discovered. This grave and its exhumation
served as a cruel reminder of what had happened and why we had come.
But before I turn to the specific question of Kosovo, I want to make some
observations about the rule of law, and the success that the United States and
Western Europe have had in planting it in foreign soil.
I. THE RULE OF LAW

The rule of law generally develops in three stages. The first is the drafting
and enacting of new codes that are consistent with human rights and modern
commercial practices. The second is the establishment of a functioning judicial
system with judges who apply the new codes and enjoy a marked degree of
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This commentary is an elaboration of my remarks at the 2004 International Law Symposium. The
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judicial independence. The third, and the one least often achieved, occurs when
the government acknowledges its limitations by submitting itself to its
constitution and laws.
Over the last thirty years, the United States and Western Europe have
engaged in massive and extended efforts to establish the rule of law in Eastern
Europe, South America, and Africa. Most of these efforts have failed at either the
second or third stage. There are remarkable exceptions, such as Poland, but most
recipients of rule of law largesse have not proceeded much beyond the stage of
adopting new codes, sometimes accompanied by dubious efforts to reform the
judiciary. Even the codes are suspect. Most are drafted by what I call "Codes R
Us." These are entities, most for profit, which draft codes for these countries,
usually without much knowledge of prior codes or local culture. Among the
drafters, you will occasionally find retired American law professors. This is
about all the rule of law efforts have achieved to date.
If you doubt what I say, take a globe or map of the world and search for
countries outside the West that have established a more or less complete rule of
law. You will not find much to celebrate. You might hesitate over countries like
Singapore where the laws are clear and the courts generally reliable. However,
the semi-authoritarian administration of Singapore has chosen to govern by law
while exempting itself from adherence to constitutional requirements. It does not
govern under the rule of law.
The countries that have failed to establish the rule of law have, by and large,
failed to achieve much in the way of real democracy or noticeable economic
development. Slowly, the rule of law crowd, among whom I count myself, have
come to recognize that rule of law, democracy, economic development, and
where applicable, nation building all must occur together for any one of them to
be successful. There can be no genuine progress in any one of these initiatives if
there is not progress in all. The rule of law requires a proto-democratic
environment to succeed, democracy requires economic development, economic
development requires rule of law, and so forth. To think about one of these fields
in isolation from the others is to make a grave mistake. Nevertheless, almost
everyone does exactly this. In fact, few people have the background to approach
these initiatives in an integrated manner. We need to find ways to address this
complex challenge.
II. NOW TO Kosovo
What does the story of little Kosovo, one-third the size of Belgium with a
population of 2,000,000, technically still a province of Serbia, contribute to our
understanding of nation building?
Kosovo is a study of what might be termed nation building in a "postconflict, pre-conflict" situation. The term "pre-conflict" is meant to indicate that
ethnic hostilities in Kosovo, and the Balkans as a whole, are not necessarily over.
Certainly, the peoples of the Balkans do not think they are over and many are just
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biding their time, dreaming of reconquest and revenge. My own view is that this
sort of situation develops following military intervention when the enemy has not
been completely defeated-militarily, economically, and psychologically. Twice
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") fought Serbia, in Bosnia and
then in Kosovo, and both times Serbia came away not just angry, but unrepentant
and much aggrieved. Serbia is in a constant state of defiance, even though this
stance hinders recovery and economic development. The Serbs are still fighting
the Balkan Wars of the 1990s.
III. SOME RECENT HISTORY
Slobodan Milosevic, formerly a communist apparatchik, came to power ten
years after Marshall Tito's death by stoking Serb nationalism, and in 1989, by
revoking Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia granted by Tito in 1974. Milosevic's
rise to power was fueled by his denunciations of Kosovo Albanians and his
endorsement of the dearly held Serbian belief that Kosovo is an ancestral holy
land the Serbs are entitled to as matters of history and religion. In the eyes of the
Serbian Orthodox Church and most Serbian nationalists, Kosovo is the Serbs'
Jerusalem, a place where the predominantly Muslim Albanians, who constitute
ninety percent of the population, are destined to be replaced by Serbian Orthodox
Christians and fully integrated into Serbia.
With revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, the Kosovo Serbs, a minority of
some ten percent in the province, had turned the tables. Serbs insisted that all
classes in primary and secondary education be taught in Serbo-Croatian. They
divided higher education into ethnic groups. Segregation and discrimination were
rampant. The Albanians adopted a policy of non-violent civil resistance,
something they have never been given proper credit for. They created their own
parallel structures, such as schools and medical clinics. The schools were often
no more than rooms in people's homes. The students suffered harassment and
worse. A number of young people I met told of Serb police bursting into their
classes, beating the teachers if they were male, and sending terrified kids home.
Sometimes the police threw canisters of tear gas into the classrooms. Meanwhile,
the social and political situation deteriorated, as did the economy of Kosovo,
which was confined to mining, smelting, a bit of light manufacturing, remittances
from sons abroad, and marginal family farming. Kosovo's Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP") contracted by fifty percent during this period, to some $400 per
capita.
In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") appeared as an alternative to
civil resistance. This small insurgent force was incapable of confronting the Serb
military, but could attack police stations, kidnap, and in some cases, execute
civilians (including Albanians viewed as collaborators), and otherwise harass the
Serb population. Let's face it, the KLA, like most insurgent and rebels groups,
committed acts of terrorism and war crimes, a point that Milosevic keeps raising
from the dock at the ICTY.
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The rejection of non-violent civil resistance by KLA leaders reflected the
growing sentiments of Kosovars Albanians: this form of resistance, along with
the parallel structures, had played into the hands of the Serbs and had
accomplished nothing. Life for the Albanian population got worse as Serb
soldiers and police responded to KLA actions with increasing violence: burning
homes, raping women, and executing men of all ages. As usual in such struggles,
the vast majority of the victims were civilians. That, I am afraid, is what the KLA
wanted to happen in order to trap Serbs into documented atrocities. The Serbs
cooperated.
In 1998 and early 1999, as the KLA became larger and more daring,
Milosevic began an ethnic cleansing program to change the ethnic composition
of Kosovo's population. At the same time, Serb response to the KLA escalated
into stark massacres of villagers by Serb militias and paramilitary groups. These
massacres caught the attention of the world. As usual, the Europeans, with the
exception of Prime Minister Tony Blair, were prepared to do nothing. President
Bill Clinton found himself on the hot seat. Finally, in the spring of 1999, NATO
bombed Serbian military forces in Kosovo-with little effect, except that Serb
actions to destroy villages and drive out Albanians reached a frantic pace.
Finally, NATO began to bomb targets in Serbia, where the power grid, the
bridges, and Milosevic's home were fair game. Milosevic initially thought the
NATO bombing campaign was a bluff, and was called by some wags "bombing
lite." Meanwhile, 1.4 million Albanian Kosovars were either internally dislocated
or driven from Kosovo. The pictures were heart-rending. The use of trains to
remove Albanians from the cities reminded the world of the Holocaust. President
Clinton, who had ill advisedly announced that he would not use ground troops,
began to reconsider. NATO would have to invade by late summer to avoid a
Balkan winter and the deaths of many Albanians hiding in the mountains of
Kosovo. Finally, as Belgrade took a fierce pounding, Milosevic realized that he
had miscalculated and agreed to remove his forces from Kosovo. With the
retreating Serb units fled half of the 200,000-300,000 Serb and Roma population
of Kosovo.
In what condition did the Serbs leave Kosovo? The NATO ground forces,
approximately 50,000, found the countryside in ruin. Fifty percent of all
Albanian homes had been destroyed or severely damaged. Almost all the
machinery in the factories had been removed to Serbia. The hospitals had been
stripped of all equipment and supplies. The electricity from the two dilapidated
coal-fired power plants was on about half the day, as was the water. The schools
were in ruin; the roads all but impassible except in four-wheel drive vehicles. The
courts were deserted. All telephone service had been lost. All land records had
been taken by the departing Serbs. Nothing worked. Mass graves were identified
and exhumation began to take place.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 18

The United Nations ("UN") assumed responsibility for governing Kosovo.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 authorizing the Secretary General
to:
... establish an international civil presence in Kosovo under which the
people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration
while establishing provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo.
The Resolution instructs the Secretary General to support "the reconstruction of
key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction," and to hold elections. These
activities are to proceed pending a final settlement of Kosovo's political status.
Pursuant to Resolution 1244, the UN installed an interim civil administration for
Kosovo, "the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo" ("UNMIK").
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") began
providing a wide range of services. The European Union ("EU") promised to look
after economic development. The military force of NATO plus Russia ("KFOR"),
joined by thousands of English speaking police from all over the world, sought to
impose order. Bernard Kouchner, the charismatic founder of Doctors without
Borders, took over as the head of UNMIK. He was a great publicist for Kosovo, if
not much of an administrator.
Food and housing materials were trucked in. European, American, and
international relief agencies, so-called non-governmental agencies ("NGOs"),
flooded in to assist. Few starved. Houses went up quickly, some built by international
agencies, and many by Albanian Kosovars, who, given the supplies, can throw up a
house in short order. UNMIK, OSCE, the EU, and the NGOs began a storm of
initiatives to improve the electricity, refurbish the schools, repave the roads, improve
health care, draft new laws, revive the legal system, prepare for the return of the
Serbian and Roma refugees, and plan for municipal governments and municipal
elections. A constitution of some sort was envisioned.
IV. IN Kosovo
My "portfolio" under the ABA's agreement with United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID"), included membership on the committee
to nominate judicial candidates for approval by the UN, membership on the
committee to draft new codes of crimes and criminal procedure, participation in
the initial training for the new judges, the design and delivery of human rights
training for defense attorneys, membership on the committee to give the law
school a new curriculum, and a general obligation to attend relentless, usually
useless, meetings with rule of law lawyers from the various law-related
components of OSCE and UNMIK. Other than that, my calendar was open.
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My first hint that something was amiss occurred when I attended a meeting
to address the question of what to do with juvenile offenders. I arrived a bit late
and found thirty people assembled to discuss the issue. I could not see why it was
necessary to have thirty people present, notwithstanding the fact that youth are a
high priority and a large number of NGOs are able to obtain funding in this area.
The French magistrate who was in charge of UNMIK's department of judicial
affairs and apparently in charge of the meeting was at that moment loudly and
avec hauteur demanding from a major in the British army instantaneous
information on youth held in military facilities. The major politely explained the
logistical impossibility of meeting this demand. One does not become a major in
the British military by taking orders from an autocratic French magistrate.
Without quite saying this, the major cast a steely eye upon the magistrate and
told her that she would receive the documentation the day following arrest, and
that was that. The room was in something of an uproar. Standing near the door
for a quick escape, I turned to my assistant, a Kosovar Albanian law student, and
asked whether there were any Kosovars in the room. "Yes," she replied, "Me."
Apparently the organizers of the meeting felt no need for ideas and
information from the locals. This scenario was to repeat itself all too often. I
inquired about the matter once and was told that we were all too busy to be
bogged down by Kosovars. Well, of course. Why hadn't that occurred to me?
The internationals found many reasons to exclude Albanians (the Serbs refused
all participation under orders from Belgrade), and to inform them of decisions
after the fact. The truth is that most of the Europeans had a marked prejudice
against Albanians and disliked working with them. Excluding Albanians from
key discussions and denying them opportunities to participate in decisions was to
haunt the whole enterprise.
As I lifted the lid to peek at the problems I was supposed to work on, I found
the big one. Were we working to create a free Kosovo, or a Kosovo to be restored
eventually to Serbia? UN Resolution 1244 contains some lofty but vague
language signaling that the UN and, therefore the prime actors in the liberation of
Kosovo, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, did
not want to address the issue of status any time soon. This postponement of the
core question threw a cloud of ambiguity over the whole enterprise. The UN
hoped to make rapid improvements in Kosovo, while ethnic feelings subsided
before it had to face up to the question of status. Postponing this question sowed
the seeds of enormous distrust among the Albanians and encouraged mischief by
Serbia.
The various administrations in Belgrade, emboldened by the delay, made it
very clear (and continue to make it clear) that they expected Kosovo back. To
keep the waters roiled, they regularly make new demands regarding Kosovo's
status. They insist that Kosovo is non-negotiable but then advance ideas like
"cantonizing" Kosovo or annexing the northern section of Kosovo, home to
many of the remaining Serbs in Kosovo and the giant Trepka mining complex.
The Kosovar Albanians continue to make it clear that they will never submit to
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any form of Serbian control or yield any territory. Their answer is always an
unequivocal no. They will not bargain over their homeland. However, they are
not at all sure that the UN will not do so.
In effect, the Kosovar Albanians are being asked to participate vigorously in
nation building without any clear prospect of becoming a nation.
The issue of status has consumed the Albanians and Serbs, almost to the
exclusion of everything else. Neither has developed a plan for a sustainable
Kosovo. The Albanians have become sullen and passive. Their hope for
independence is fading. Most of the money committed by the international
community has been spent with very little to show in the form of economic
development. The international community now finds itself in a Catch 22.
Kosovo does not have the resources to survive as an independent nation. On the
other hand, the first Serb official who arrives in Kosovo to assert even the most
marginal authority on behalf of Serbia is a dead man walking. He would have to
arrive as a passenger in a column of tanks. The war would begin anew.
Deferring a decision like this is not a mere delay. It is a decision-with
consequences. The UN decided to let developments in Kosovo play themselves
out in hopes that a solution to the status of Kosovo might emerge. This decision
is the cause of the UN's current dilemma: grant independence to Kosovo,
precipitating a political and economic collapse, or return control of Kosovo to
Serbia, precipitating another bout of war and ethnic cleansing. Neither option is
acceptable. The UN has put itself in a position where it must stay and as it stays,
it is seen increasingly less as a liberator, and more as an occupier. Occupiers
quickly become impatient and dictatorial; the occupied become angry and
subversive.
Many of the problems now surrounding the issue of status might have been
avoided had the UN followed the strong recommendations contained in the "Kosovo
Report," published in 2000 by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo.
The commission's members included Justice Richard Goldstone, Hanan Ashrawi,
Richard Falk, Michael Ignatieff, and Martha Minnow. Their report called for
conditional independence for Kosovo. There were a number of advantages to
granting conditional independence soon after cessation of formal hostilities.
These included a clear direction for the international community, a status the
Albanians might have been inspired to protect and expand, a goal for
international funding sources, and the elimination of Serbia from the debate at a
time that it more or less expected "punishment." ("You engaged in ethnic
cleansing and other atrocities; you lost the war; you lose Kosovo.") I am quite
sure that such a status would have galvanized both the Albanian and international
communities. I cannot say that this approach would have eventually produced a
modern country able to stand on its own two feet. It was, however, the only
approach that might have avoided the current muddle. It seems that decisions
made early in nation building, such as the fatal decision to disband the Iraqi army
and put 400,000 unemployed young men on the streets, some still armed, are
often the most critical.
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As I went about my work, I discovered countless smaller problems
everywhere. With little or no evidence, Albanian prosecutors were obtaining
convictions of Serbs for various atrocities. Trial panels consisting of all Albanian
judges were all too willing to convict, most often because the judges were easily
convinced, but sometimes because they were too terrified of radicals to vote to
acquit a Serb. No matter what an Albanian judge experienced during the war at
the hands of Serbs, even possibly from the defendant, he never recused himself.
UNMIK pressured the new Supreme Court to overturn these convictions, which
it immediately did. The Supreme Court, consisting of members who at that time
served from year to year at the pleasure of UNMIK, could be cooperative.
Finally, Kosovar and international prosecutors, afraid of Albanian response if
they abandoned weak or frivolous cases against Serb defendants, tried the cases
to disprove guilt and show the Albanians that the wrong people were in the dock.
While laudable in some absolute moral sense, this approach did nothing to help
establish the integrity of the legal system-or to persuade the Albanians.
UNMIK then tried salting the five-member trial panels with an international
judge on each panel on the theory that one international judge could prevent a
miscarriage of justice. International judges had absolutely no effect on the
outcome of cases. Only three votes were necessary to convict, and the Albanians
judges voted as a block. Then, UNMIK went to panels consisting of three
internationals and two Albanians. (The Kosovar Serbs continued their boycott of
UNMIK activities.) Even these panels proved unpredictable. Now, international
prosecutors (several from district attorneys' offices in the United States) try cases
of inter-ethnic crime before panels consisting entirely of international judges.
This development occurred just as the prosecutions of former KLA members
began. The timing did not escape the Albanians nor did the fact that defendants
have no access to international defense attorneys, only local attorneys who are
rarely able to compete with the international prosecutors. Clearly, the judicial
system belongs to the UN and not to Kosovo.
I should add that during my tenure in Kosovo, it was necessary to bring attorneys
from Serbia to defend Serbs. No Albanian attorney would do it, nor would a Serb
defendant accept the services of an Albanian attorney. To protect the Serb attorneys,
it sometimes became necessary to secrete them into Kosovo in armed personnel
carriers. Once they arrived, they were assigned armed guards and the location of their
quarters was kept secret. UNMIK and OSCE were legitimately fearful that they
would be killed. Participating in this "underground railway" is one of the ways I
became acquainted with Serb attorneys. They displayed courage in coming to
Kosovo. I admired them for it.
The UN has great powers of denial and equally great powers to create alternative
realities. One of the first acts of UNMIK was to declare the European Convention on
Human Rights applicable in Kosovo. This appears a grand gesture until you realize
that human rights, like constitutional rights in the United States, are rights that run
against the government. In Kosovo, UNMIK is the government. The UN takes the
position that, as a super-national entity, such conventions do not apply to it and
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points out that it has special immunity under the UN Charter, as do its employees
when acting in their official capacity. OSCE, KFOR, and the EU adopted similar
positions. The international community was above such mundane concerns as human
rights. It had come with benevolence and wisdom and should not be bogged down by
challenges from the locals. So much for human rights in Kosovo.
In my efforts to teach the Convention to defense attorneys in case they might
be able to use it some day, I encountered a number of logistical problems. I was
required to have interpreters fluent in both Albanian and Serbo-Croatian as well
as materials prepared in both Albanian and Serbo-Croatian in case Serb lawyers
showed up. During my tenure none did. On the other hand, no one told me that
Bosniacs and Turks would attend the training in Prizren. I discovered this half an
hour before the training began. I immediately sent staff to find suitable interpreters.
They were available in Prizren but had left for the weekend to hike in the mountains.
The Bosniacs and Turks stayed, however. They clearly understood a great deal of
Albanian but would not acknowledge it. Refusing to speak any language other
than that of your ethnic group is a common way of asserting the rights of your
ethnic group. After the war, almost everyone who had been fluent in several
languages common to Kosovo suddenly became monolingual.
Another problem arose. I could distribute the Convention in Albanian and
Serbian but that was of little use. The Convention contains general principles that
acquire specific meaning only through decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights. Those decisions are available in English and French, and only in
English and French. None of the attorneys I worked with, some ninety, could
read either language. The decisions are typically twenty pages, single-spaced,
and follow a standard but awkward formula. I tried summaries and translations of
key passages. However, nothing I could do would enable them to do their own
research. After I left, someone translated what were described as the forty most
significant decisions. The body of case law from the Court is enormous. Forty
decisions would not even scrape the surface, but this is the sort of duct-tape
approach that is often necessary in Kosovo.
In an effort to jump-start the law school, the acting German Chancellor of the
University of Prishtina proposed the adoption of the law curriculum from the
University of Bologna. The law faculty, older men who had last engaged in
serious teaching ten years earlier under a socialist curriculum and who had little
inclination or incentive to change their ways, rejected the proposal. The
Chancellor, encouraged by those of us in the international community who care
about such things as curricula, assembled leaders of the faculty. He informed
them that they would approve the curriculum or those voting against it would
never teach again. So far so good. I could see the faculty faces; they were
buckling. Then, quite unexpectedly, the Chancellor added the fatal sweetener:
"But if you do vote for it, I will grant you life-time tenure." The result of this
deal is a tenured faculty whose members resist the new curriculum. The old
guard is still in control. Nothing has changed at the law school, except that a few
more open-minded professors, a small minority, now understand what is
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necessary to have a real European law school. Most serious law students wish
passionately that they could attend law school elsewhere.
A similar problem arose with the appointment of Kosovar judges. Where
could we find even remotely qualified candidates? Only from among the judges
who presided in the courts ten years earlier under the socialist regime. Too many
of them have a "forget nothing/learn nothing" mind set. In the absence of an
alternative, UNMIK appointed them to the bench. A rule for nation builders: you
cannot advance your endeavor beyond the capacities and values of those local
people you need to use.
A smaller, technical problem bedeviled the courts. The lights and heat went
off without notice on a daily basis. The courthouses were given generators but
these supported only the administrative offices. I have spent winter days in cold,
dark courtrooms monitoring trials. It turns out that justice can proceed under such
circumstances if the court is not relying on technology and you are wearing long
underwear, a sweater, a woolen suit, a heavy topcoat, a ski cap, and gloves.
At the ABA office we had a large generator that went on when the power
went off. Actually, it went on just after you lost the text open on your computer.
Battery devices eventually solved this problem. But, there were others. The
Albanian staff had to be reminded to buy fuel and not to push certain mystery
buttons on the generator.
In many ways the most poignant development in Kosovo was the boom
economy. You could see from the beginning that a bust would follow. The
economy brought Albanians home from the diaspora, mostly young men who
hoped that they could at last find work near their families. This economy grew
out of the money spent by UNMIK, OSCE, NATO, NGOs, and all their
employees. The boom was a "tourist" economy. Shops, restaurants, and internet
cafes opened all over the place. Within a year, as the international community
began to withdraw, these fragile enterprises began to close and have been closing
ever since. There is absolutely nothing in Kosovo to interest real tourists. I
returned to Kosovo in the summers of 2002 and 2003 to teach at the law school
and visit with friends and colleagues. The commercial districts of Prishtina are
increasingly pocked by empty storefronts. The hope and energy are vanishing.
V. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

After Paula and I returned home in 2001, banks began to appear in Kosovo,
relieving the NGOs of the need to bring great wads of cash from Macedonian
banks to run their offices and fund their projects. I found that there is nothing
quite like crossing the grim, chaotic, diesel-polluted border between Kosovo and
Macedonia with $50,000 in twenty dollar bills on your person. UNMIK adopted
a full complement of commercial laws, established a commercial court and
proposed to privatize public property. Statistics were gathered. Excise, import,
and income taxes were successfully imposed. As of 2003, 50,000 businesses had
registered. Fifty-seven percent of these businesses are wholesale and retail trade,
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auto repair shops, and small businesses that repair and construct buildings.
Another eight percent are in restaurants. Manufacturing accounts for only eight to
eleven percent of the businesses. Approximately eighty-seven percent of the
work force is employed by businesses with one to four employees. Only one
percent of all employees work for businesses that employ more than fifty
workers. Eighty percent of all businesses are sole proprietorships. One percent of
all businesses are foreign owned. Sixty percent of the population lives in rural
villages working the land. Fifteen percent of the population receives welfare of
about fifty-two euros a month per family. Remittances from sons working abroad
account for thirty percent of the GDP.
UNMIK adopted a provisional constitutional framework and a Europeanstyle governmental structure. The Kosovo assembly has been elected and now
sits. Kosovo has a president and a prime minister. UNMIK has created a full
battery of ministries.
Taxes collected are close to meeting expenditures for the Kosovo General
Budget of 516 million Euros. However, this budget is a bit illusory since it omits
the value of the goods and services provided by the international community and
the protection provided by KFOR and the international police. Someday Kosovo
will have to find the money to cover these items.
Foreign aid so necessary to continue to upgrade Kosovo's ragged
infrastructure is rapidly declining. For example, the EU, Kosovo's largest donor,
contributed 362,000,000 euros in 2000, but only 51,000,000 euros in 2004.
Despite the substantial investments in economic development by the
international community, the unemployment rate is fifty to sixty percent. Once
again, bright, ambitious young people are leaving. The road and communication
systems are wholly inadequate. The departure of the international community
reduces the number of customers for small business and costs precious jobs.
The privatization initiative has hit snags involving disputed ownership and
the very limited number of businesses that attract foreign investment. The huge
Trepka mining complex that was the backbone of Kosovo's economy stands
almost empty. It has valuable deposits of coal and zinc. Like most socialist
mines, it is an environmental disaster requiring hundreds of millions to clean up.
VI. THE ISSUE OF STATUS
UNMIK has adopted standards that it insists the Kosovo government must
meet before the question of status can be addressed.
UNMIK's mantra has become "standards before status." These are the eight
standards:
1. Functioning democratic institutions,
2. The rule of law, including functioning and ethical police and
judiciary,
3. Freedom of movement, that is, safety of movement for all minorities,
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4. The right of return for all refugees and their integration into society,
5. Market economic development, including appropriate legislation,
balanced budgets, and privatization,
6. Respect for property rights, including the resolution of ownership
disputes and restitution of land,
7. "Normalized" dialogue with Belgrade, and
8. Reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corp (an
incipient defense force) and increased minority participation in the
Corp.
UNMIK is looking to Kosovo' s "Provisional Institutions of Self-Government" to
achieve these standards. Under the provisional constitution, that government is
entrusted with authority over domestic affairs, including the economy, education,
transport, local administration, judiciary, prisons, and the media. At least it looks
that way on paper.
The constitution reserves to UNMIK the power to dissolve the assembly and call
new elections, veto legislation, set the financial and budgetary parameters for the
budget, appoint and remove prosecutors and judges, control the Kosovo Protection
Corp, address all "international" matters, and serve as the sole point of contact for
KFOR. In addition, UNMIK's "Independent" Media Commission has the power to
shut down newspapers and television stations. In other words, almost all the
standards are actually controlled by UNMIK. The self-government created in the
constitution is largely an illusion. The Kosovar Albanians are acutely aware of this.
UNMIK's attitude is one of imperial condescension to a struggling colony. They do
not understand why the Albanians seem so little engaged with their government. The
Albanians are increasingly distrustful and their distrust has led to passivity. They no
longer want to play what they see as UNMIK's games.
Let us look at a couple of the standards that UNMIK has imposed. Freedom
of movement and the right of refugees to return safely are impossible to achieve. If
50,000 NATO troops and 1,000 English-speaking policeman could not provide
safety for minorities, what chance is there for the Kosovo interim government to do
so? The Serbs remaining in Kosovo live in enclaves guarded by NATO. Every so
often, Serb refugees dare to return to their Kosovo homes. And every so often a Serb
is shot. This deters other refugees. The gunmen do not appear numerous, but they are
almost impossible to catch.
Privatization is under the control of UNMIK and has been beset with difficulties,
such as the claim raised by Serbia for pensions owed by these companies. No one
knows the extent of these and other obligations. No one is going to buy a business
with unknown liabilities. In fact, no one is going to buy a business in Kosovo, not
even wealthy Kosovar businessmen living abroad. They are not fools. There are
other privatization problems. The larger businesses involving electricity and
telephones are not for sale because they are technologically entangled with Serbia. If
you call your neighbor on a landline, the call goes through the central exchange in
Serbia.
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How can land disputes be resolved? The Serbs took the land records and
have not returned them. In any case, UNMIK retains control over the Housing
and Property Directorate, the entity in charge of resolving land disputes. The
Directorate's work has been delayed while UNMIK creates a land registry from
scratch. I might add that we never knew who actually owned the ABA building.
There was no way to know. We were lucky, but other NGOs paid rent only to
have the "true owner" show up and demand that he receive rent. In villages,
where most of the slaughter and brutality occurred, restitution of houses and
fields is a bad idea. Albanian villagers will extract revenge. They will not
necessarily distinguish "good" Serbs from "bad." In one instance, a young
Albanian returned to his village to find his close Serbian friend waiting to greet
him. The Albanian apparently thought matters over. He knew that his Serbian
friend had done nothing to him, but the friend was now using vacant fields the
Albanian's family had traditionally farmed. Several days after coming home, he
visited his friend and shot him in the face, killing him. The Albanian explained
that having a Serbian friend had become an intolerable contradiction and made
him crazy. Besides, the Serb should never have "claimed" his family's land. So
much for land disputes. Actually, what often occurs is that Serb refugees sell
their properties to Albanian Kosovars by quitclaim deed. These Serbs are glad to
have the money for property they have no prospect of using.
What should the "normalized dialogue" with Belgrade include? Privatization,
trade, telephones, and electricity maybe, but not status. Only UNMIK can talk to
Belgrade about that topic (and only when there is a government in BelgradeSerbia has problems forming governments).
The consequences of all of this are appalling. Commercial banks will not
loan to the Kosovar government because there is no debtor nation to look to.
Kosovo businesses are similarly hamstrung. Lenders will not loan to them
because the lenders do not know what country the businesses are in or will be in
and therefore, do not know what laws will apply in the future. International
investment will not arrive until status is determined, creating a Catch 22 situation
for economic development. Economic development cannot occur until status is
decided, if then. Kosovo's trade balance is awful. Only a few nations trade with
Kosovo, and Kosovo has little to offer. Cigarettes and gasoline are actively
smuggled. Organized crime has moved to drugs and human trafficking, although
in my view Kosovo remains less corrupt than the surrounding countries. (You
can get an argument on this.) The Serbian population in the city of Mitrovica
(near the Trepka mine) runs parallel institutions with the open support of Serbia.
At least temporarily, UNMIK has acquiesced to this de facto partition. The
judiciary is subject to corruption. A Kosovo judge earns approximately $400 per
month ($250 when I was there). The principal judge with whom I worked to
established the Kosovo Judges' Association has since been removed from the
bench for taking a $400 bribe.
For all the diversity and talent within the UN staff, the UN can miss the
obvious. It appears oblivious of the overwhelming resentment caused by a
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Kosovar judge earning $5,000 a year sitting with an international judge earning
$140,000, who may know less than the Kosovo judge. Such salary disparities
exist between locals and internationals in all fields. The Kosovars have begun to
think that the internationals are stringing out their work to retain their salaries.
The decision-making processes of the UN are ponderous and opaque. The
UN is a rigid, hierarchical organization full of talented bureaucrats who,
unfortunately, are either powerless or too fearful to make decisions. Moreover, it
remains a mystery what decisions are made at headquarters in New York.
UNMIK's committee to draft new codes of crimes and criminal procedure for
Kosovo was making progress, but slow progress because Kosovar law professors
had been charged with most of the actual drafting. Everything they drafted had to
be translated into English. Suddenly and inexplicably the project was taken over
by New York. Many months later completed codes returned. They were well
done (unless you favor rights for defendants), but they had been prepared without
input from Kosovar Albanians-or, for that matter, Kosovo Serbs. The tendency
of New York to withdraw or retain most significant authority (or worse, second
guess) may explain why Kosovo has had four UNMIK administrators in five
years. Of course, it takes each new administrator several months to get up to
speed administratively and to begin to fathom the ethnic situation. A great deal of
time has been lost by these frequent changes.
VII. COMPASSION FATIGUE

Perhaps the most disturbing development for Kosovo is that the international
community has grown weary of hearing about war atrocities, weary of human
suffering. Its attitude is: the war occurred five years ago; get over it. The
community has trouble remembering that they are dealing with people many of
whom had their houses burned, watched their fathers and sons being executed,
and saw their mothers, sisters and daughters raped. The international community
cannot wrap its mind around the rage these experiences have engendered, rage
that carries people to the edge of suicide or mental collapse-or that explodes
into fierce, often indiscriminate, violence. I recounted to my assistant, a sweet
generous young woman, a remarkable story that I had heard. A young Kosovar
Serb had planted himself in front of an advancing column of Serbian tanks.
Unlike Tienneman square, no reporters or cameras were present; the world was
not watching. The lead tank simply ground him under. "Why do you tell me
about one good Serb?" My assistant shouted, "I don't want to hear about one
good Serb!" She had lost five members of her family to Serb violence. A young
Albanian lawyer in our office lost eleven members of her family. This group of
elders lived together in one house. Those able to walk would not abandon those
too crippled to do so. The Serbs, some of whom were neighbors, torched the
house. All the old people died in the fire.
I will not tell you stories of barbarity that would stun you. I will tell you that
the Serb paramilitaries, many of them career criminals and sociopaths released by
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Milosevic from the prisons and jails of Serbia to join in the carnage, were
frequently high on amphetamines and cocaine. In some instances, they drew red
streaks across their faces and bodies with the blood of their victims. War paint!
The paramilitaries preferred to kill with knives. No cruelty conceivable by the
human mind was off-limits. In fact, the more grotesque the crime the greater their
pleasure. So, for many Kosovar Albanians, the only good Serb is a dead Serb.
Trying to force the Albanians prematurely into a cooperative relationship with
Serbia is a fool's game.
As the international community grows weary of hearing about war trauma,
the ICTY has become a victim of unintended consequences. The Court was not
established to revive the political careers of defendants, yet, this year, two years
after the start of his trial, Milosevic was elected in absentia to the Serbian
Assembly. Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party and an admitted
paramilitary leader in custody at the ICTY awaiting trial, was also elected in
absentia to the Assembly. His extremist party won twenty-seven percent of the
vote. The villains have now become heroic Davids before the Goliath of the
ICTY. The Court itself has not persuaded the Kosovar Albanians that it will
accomplish anything good or useful for them. What the Kosovars know is that
Misosevic's trial is interminable and that victims who go to testify are badgered
by Milosevic with obscure facts about their families (provided to Milosevic by
the Serbian secret police) and made to fear that Serb hit men can reach them.
The bureaucrats of UNMIK and OSCE are impatient. They arrived with a
very sophisticated checklist and a series of templates, which they imposed
without regard to the facts on the ground. It was all they knew to do. The
bureaucrats want to strike items off the to-do list to show New York that rapid
progress is occurring. I am reminded of my days at the Office of Economic
Opportunity during the "War on Poverty." We had to show that any grant to
develop new approaches had either solved problems or developed workable
solutions. No grant for such a project could last longer than three years. Congress
wanted instant gratification and churning of the funds. Worse, the White House
under President Johnson wanted to march from success to success. The White
House would accept no other outcome. It had the same attitude toward the war in
Vietnam. The White House believed what it insisted on being told. It lost the war
in Vietnam and the War on Poverty. The UN, OSCE, NATO, and the EU could
easily lose everything they are trying to achieve-if they do not reevaluate what
they have undertaken and what has yet to be done.
First, not last, the UN must resolve the question of status. The UN and the
nations supporting the enterprise in Kosovo must face the fact that they cannot
return Kosovo to Serbia, not in any manner. It cannot partition Kosovo without
destroying any chance that it might have of becoming a functioning state. It
cannot grant unconditional independence and more or less walk away; Kosovo
would suffer immediate political and economic implosion. No one wants an
indefinite UN protectorate; the Kosovo Albanians would surely conclude that
liberators had now become occupiers, if they have not already reached this
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conclusion. So we come full circle to the conditional independence recommended in
2000 by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo. But what would that
accomplish and how soon would it accomplish it? Certainly, conditional independence would require the continuation of technical support and an increase in financial
commitment. However, if realistic criteria for independence were established along
with time lines for reaching full independence, Kosovo Albanians and the
international community would at least have a clear direction to go in. The Kosovar
Albanians might yet be reenergized and international donors might yet have their
interest renewed. This approach is a long shot, a real long shot, and would come five
years late! But, the other options offer even less promise.
In 2003, the international community attempted to open a dialogue between
Kosovo and Serbia on 'technical matters," such as transport and telecommunications,
refugee return, and missing persons. Working groups on such matters involving
Kosovar Albanians and representatives of the Serbian government were established,
but Kosovo's Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi withdrew, leaving the President and
Chairman of the Assembly to represent Kosovo. In every issue lurked the question of
status. Although the parties talked (which is progress), almost nothing of
consequence was decided. Now the UN indicates that in 2005 it will review the
progress toward the eight standards and open negotiations on the status of Kosovo.
This cautious approach does not excite enthusiasm among Kosovar Albanians.
VIII. NATION BUILDING
The UN finds itself in the role it seeks to avoid, the custodian of a place that
no one has a solution for. Without receiving a clear mandate from the Security
Council in Resolution 1244 and without deciding the issue of status, the UN has
drifted into nation building. The introduction of democracy, the creation of the
Kosovo provisional government, and the establishment of the eight standards
constitute de facto nation building. Since the UN does not possess the expertise
for nation building, it can reasonably be said that the UN is engaged in on-the-job
training.
If the UN does not have a handle on nation building, no one else does either.
People cite this country or that country as examples of nation building. (East
Timor is too shaky to count.) Setting aside post-war Germany and Japan where
"rebuilding" of established, sophisticated nations occurred, the only successful
example of nation building that we have in recent history is South Korea-and it
took over fifty years. The United States was fully dedicated to the project as part
of its effort to stem the tide of communism. At one point, the United States was
spending the equivalent of 1/70th of its GNP on South Korea.
The path of South Korea to independent nationhood with the rule of law,
democracy, and a self-sustaining economy was anything but straight and
predictable. The first elected president, Syngman Rhee, though pro-American,
proved ineffectual and corrupt. Eventually, he was forced to step down. General
Park Chung Hee almost immediately took over the government in a coup d'etat.
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Park instituted a program of reform designed to stimulate the economy-and
satisfy the U.S. However, the economy remained weak until the Vietnam War
came along. The United States desperately needed steel, chemicals, and other
industrial products from South Korea. Purchases for the Vietnam War enabled
South Korea to build up its industrial capacity and become a regional economic
power. In 1979 after eighteen years in power, Park was assassinated. A military
junta effectively ruled the government (sometimes through surrogates) until, in
1997, Kim Doe Jun, the leader of the opposition, became the first president
elected by the political opposition. Finally, South Korea achieved what appears
to be a stable democracy. But, as you see, success required an enormous
investment, fifty years, and luck. It was a long rocky road and the outcome was
by no means assured, regardless of United States intentions or efforts.
The South Koreans continue to play bare-knuckle politics, however. In 2004,
the current president, Roh Moo Hyan, was impeached by the conservative
assembly for alleged violations of a minor election law. As often happens in
South Korea, the people, seventy percent of whom supported Roh, took to the
streets, as South Koreans traditionally do when deeply dissatisfied. Subsequently,
the assembly changed hands, the Constitutional Court set aside the impeachment,
and Roh returned to the presidency. No one was assassinated, the military stayed
in the barracks, the people spoke, and the politicians followed the rules-more or
less. Democracy can be a messy business and tends to follow cultural patterns,
something we need to keep in mind as we consider nation building in Kosovo
and elsewhere.
Is the international community committed to Kosovo for anything resembling
the effort in South Korea? Of course not. But if it were, it would need to face the
fact that Kosovo has no bureaucratic class, no technocrats, no statesmen or
national leaders. Such people are a generation away, maybe two. The Albanians
are skilled traders and canny businessmen. However, they do not yet have a good
feel for collaboration or coalitions. The clan structure is very strong. The man of
the house rules absolutely. In the rural areas women are often little more than
beasts of burden. Vendettas and blood feuds are on the decline but not unknown.
While we were in Kosovo, members of feuding clans shot at each other from
separate moving cars. During the exchange of fire, one of the cars crashed head
on into a third car, killing most of the innocent occupants.
The current generation of younger Kosovars is in many ways a lost generation.
They were denied higher education for most of the apartheid years and are desperate
to catch up. They are struggling to throw off the most oppressive elements of their
culture. Few leaders, young or old, have much experience outside of Kosovo. The
Kosovars have little feel for modern democratic government or capitalist economics.
Why should they? They have no experience with these "panaceas." Contrary to the
beliefs of the neo-cons around President Bush, democracy and capitalism are not the
natural order of things; they are not instincts that automatically guide people once
released from the chains of socialism or dictatorship. They are acquired tastes, and
these tastes can vary.
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If all of this were not daunting enough, the international community must face
that fact that dealing with Kosovo requires dealing with the other states of the Balkan
Peninsula. Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia are
among Kosovo's natural business and trading partners. They are interdependent
whether they like it or not. We must realize that the countries of the Balkan
peninsula, except for Greece, are a group of post-war states collectively destined for
failure and the consequences of failure-a diaspora of unwanted workers flooding
Western Europe, growing organized crime with tentacles throughout Europe, the
prospects of future wars, and, now, a possible safe haven for terrorists. The real
project here is the building of a viable structure for the broken countries and
provinces of the former Yugoslavia, under whatever name and under whatever
political and economic framework that will advance the region towards membership
in the EU. The situation is reminiscent of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 when
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy created the first version of
Yugoslavia out of disparate claims and territories.
No one bargained for all of this. However, some people in the current
administration want to undertake the reformation of the Middle East. Such an
undertaking, if it goes forward, will make the problems of Kosovo and the Balkans
appear trivial.
A. Lessons?
Can we extract useful lessons from Kosovo? One is that we know almost
nothing about nation building-least of all the political and cultural alchemy that
produces a commitment to the democratic process. A second is that amateurs,
and we are all amateurs, cannot do nation building quickly and on the cheap.
Billions of dollars, decades of effort, and of course, good luck are necessary. A
third lesson is perhaps that it cannot be done at all, at least not by imposition
from the outside by the international community.
Despite the rhetoric, the current U.S. administration has no intention of
making more than a token effort in Afghanistan. The rubric of nation building
was merely one more moral justification for invasion. No one in his right mind,
not even the current administration, believes that nation building in Afghanistan
is possible, unless the Afghanis happen to stumble upon it themselves.
Iraq will be the next big test. Iraq makes Kosovo look like the garden of
Eden.
B. Postscripts
The nation building that was supposed to follow the invasion and conquest of
Iraq is not happening, and is not going to happen. One may decry the lack of
planning, the insufficiency of troops, the innocence and ignorance of Paul
Bremer, and the appalling belief that Ahmed Chalabi was going to be the man to
pull Iraq together. No doubt these have contributed to the present confusion.
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Behind the confusion, however, move Iraqi politicians of all sorts-the interim
prime minister, Mr. Allawi, other members of the interim government, tribal
leaders, religious leaders of the Sunni and Shiite sects, Baathists, Kurds, and
Turkomen. Iraqi politicians are a rough crowd. They are also skilled in their way.
They are gradually shoving the United States to the sidelines. The toppling of
Saddam and the determination of Iraqis to run Iraq their way rather than follow
some plan conceived by the United States may yet lead the Iraqis to form a
semblance of a representative government. The government will have to be a
coalition offering sufficient incentives to keep most of players at the table and
procedures that allow for periodic changes or modifications in leadership.
Whatever government the Iraqis form will be the product of hard negotiations
that may, at times, involve violence. That government may not meet our criteria
for a true democracy and may ignore all U.S. plans and wishes, if only to
establish its independence and legitimacy. It may become obstreperous. It may
disappoint and infuriate the United States. It will, however, be an improvement
on Saddam's rule and, while Islamic in many ways, will probably have a secular
core that limits the influence of clerics and extreme fundamentalists.
The Iraqis will not go the way of Iran, although Iran is clearly pushing for
such a result. Enough Iraqis understand the disaster of a theocracy. Iraq is blessed
with oil. Money will not be a stumbling block. If a functional government does
develop in Iraq, it will add weight to the notion that nation building cannot be
imposed from the outside but must arise from within, taking a form that reflects
the people and their culture. Iraq may yet become a modern nation, if we stand
back, but not too far back. The U.S. forces should hover around, if permitted to
do so, to ensure that external powers (especially Iran, which has armed Muqtada
al-Sadr's Medhi Army) stay out of Iraq and that no one seizes power by force
during the inevitable pushing and shoving for political power that will almost
certainly offend our sensibilities.
The alternative appears to be civil war and chaos. Iraq may yet explode into
terrible wars that destroy not only its prospects for the future but ignite much of
the Middle East from Turkey to Syria to Iran. The United States would then find
itself somewhere between quagmire and Armageddon. Let us hope that the Iraqi
people of whatever ethnicity or sect of Islam see that they have much to lose and
little to gain in war.
Let us also hope that the present and future administrations learn that people
and countries are too proud, too stubborn, and too complicated to fit our present,
limited notions of nation building.
In Kosovo the volcano of ethnic hatred, which the UN had tried to persuade
itself was cooling, instead erupted in March 2004. Three events provided the
catalyst. Kosovar Albanians were infuriated when Serbs closed the main road
from Prishtina to Skopje where it passes through a Serbian enclave. The Serbs
were protesting the shooting of a Serb teenager by unknown assailants. Next,
Albanian veterans and other supporters of the KLA organized a demonstration to
protest the prosecution of former KLA leaders for war crimes and crimes against
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humanity. The following day newspapers and television stations reported that
Serbs with dogs had chased four young Albanian boys into the Ibar River where
three drowned. Immediately, over thirty-three riots broke out across Kosovo. The
number of rioters is estimated at 50,000. At least 730 homes of minorities along
with thirty-six orthodox churches and monasteries, some of them architectural
masterpieces from the fourteenth century, were burned. Approximately 4,000
minority Kosovars-Serbs, Roma, and Ashkali (Albanian speaking Roma) were
left homeless. Albanians who live in Serb majority areas were forced to flee. It is
reported that Albanian crowds in some communities systematically destroyed
every single minority home. KFOR troops were completely unprepared. Some
simply watched houses burn. When KFOR troops finally intervened, an Albanian
threw a grenade. Approximately 1,000 people were injured during the riots,
including some 180 soldiers and police. Eleven Albanians and eight Serbs were
killed during the rioting.
When the dust cleared, the international community concluded that while
three of the four boys had drowned in the Ibar, Serbs played no role in the event.
Kosovo television stations began to reconsider their decision to broadcast such
inflammatory information without bothering to check the facts. Most Albanians I
know were mortified by the riots, although not all were convinced that Serbs had
not, in fact, chased the boys into the river. (The surviving boy was so
beleaguered by leading questions and suggestions that he was unsure what had
happened, but, ultimately, he absolved Serbs of any responsibility for the events
surrounding the drownings).
UNMIK denounced the Albanian community for ethnic cleansing. International human rights groups denounced UNMIK, KFOR, and the police for
incompetence and complacency. Most of the 2,000,000 Kosovar Albanians took
no part in the riots. However, the suddenness of rioting in so many communities
and the efficient destruction of minority houses in many of these communities
suggests some organization behind the rioting. Some believe that local radicals
directed events. Others believe that some central entity played a part.
Certainly, UNMIK, KFOR, and the police will take greater care in the future.
However, while the international community wrings its hands over what they see
as a setback in the development of a multicultural society, Albanian radicals are
continuing the reverse ethnic cleansing that began with the return of the
Albanians from the refugee camps and mountains. More minorities are leaving in
terror and almost none of the earlier minority refugees want to return. Kosovo
will not be a multicultural society, despite the UN's strong commitment to
preserving the multicultural nature of Kosovo and to multiculturalism generally.
The logic of the situation is that the Albanians are ridding themselves of Serbs
and their cultural heritage, along with collaborators, to ensure that Serb claims to
Kosovo become meaningless. The determination to cleanse arises out of the
international community's failure to resolve the status of Kosovo. The Kosovar
Albanian community, not just the radicals within it, is going to subvert all efforts
to achieve any form of multicultural society until the UN makes it absolutely
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clear that Kosovo and its people will never again be subject to control from
Belgrade. The eight standards UNMIK imposed as a condition of resolving status
are increasingly out of reach. Bill Clinton cites Kosovo as one of his great
international successes. The sad truth is that Kosovo is rapidly becoming one
more complete failure in nation building, not because the international
community lacks good intentions or adequate resources, but because nation
building remains an infinitely complex process beyond our current cultural
sophistication, capacity, patience, and commitment.
A recent Rand Corporation study concluded that Kosovo is "the bestmanaged of the U.S. [led] post-cold-war ventures in nation building." This
conclusion underscores just how far we have to go.

